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Throughout history formulaic thinking has been the high road to military disaster. The French outnumbered the
British by odds of more than three to one at Agincourt, but numerical advantage turned out not to be the deciding
factor, and the prevailing idea that armored cavalry would always defeat infantry was proven wrong.[1] In 1806 the
army of Prussia had one of the most impressive reputations in Europe, but Prussia's mastery of 18th-century
"chessboard warfare" could not save it from Napoleon's onslaught.[2] The Wehrmacht managed to smash through
France's defenses in 1940, not because Germany possessed any superiority in either numbers or quality of men and
machines, but because the French had anchored their strategy upon a rigid and misguided concept of warfare.[3] A
probably apocryphal story tells that when President Nixon took office in 1969, members of the new Administration
applied a computer model to determine how long it would take to win the Vietnam War. Once data concerning body
counts, kill ratios, gross national products, and the like had been entered, the answer came back: "You won the war in
1964."[4]
Academic political scientists have become fond of formulaic thought in the most literal sense. A sizable body of
scholars within the social science discipline practice methods of analysis in which they reduce issues of international
relations and strategic affairs to mathematical equations in the attempt to explain or forecast political events. When
one considers the advantages of a system that allows one to predict the future, it is easy to see why those who favor
this method have begun to suggest it as a tool for both makers of foreign policy and commanders in the armed forces.
Military professionals should approach these methods with caution.[5]
This article discusses two complementary techniques used in the effort to transform international relations into a
mathematical science. These techniques are formal modeling and statistical methods, also referred to as quantitative
analysis. Formal modeling refers to the process by which scholars develop abstract intellectual theories to explain how
political events take place. These abstract theories are deductive, use formal (or mathematical) logic, and are depicted
as mathematical models; thus the term "formal modeling." In practice, many formal modelers are content to stop their
research at the point of model design, and the hypotheses of these formal models may be tested using various
statistical methods.
In statistical analysis, researchers attempt to fit statistical information into the theories represented by the models.[6]
Many scholars engaged in this work are content merely to hunt for correlations that seem to confirm the validity of
theoretical propositions. However, those who practice a discipline known as "expected utility" analysis believe that
they have advanced to the point at which their models, when combined with the correct data, will allow them to
predict the outcome of current and prospective political events.
Our use of the terms "formal modeling" and "quantitative analysis" throughout this article is intended to be broadly
inclusive. Political scientists have invented many variants of these techniques, and the debates among practitioners are
fierce, but in our opinion all of these scholars make the same fundamental mistakes. Their understanding of politics
and warfare is dangerously rigid and hopelessly abstract. Where strategic issues demand creative approaches to often
unique conditions, they would substitute one-size-fits-all analytical methods whose input can be highly selective,
processes unduly rigid, and outcomes dangerously unverifiable.
The Nature of Theory

Those who practice quantitative methodology in the academic sense would reduce all of war--indeed all of human
affairs--to mathematical equations. Formal modelers aspire to give shape to what they define as "scientific" norms of
human behavior, with the goal of answering political questions in the same definitive way that natural scientists answer
questions about the behavior of subatomic particles. These theorists are not particularly interested in the details of
specific wars, political issues, or historical epochs. Rather, they seek general theories of politics that will apply
universally.
A general theory is, by its nature, purely abstract. Information of the sort found in newspapers, historical accounts, and
intelligence reports has little place in developing such a theory, and the knowledge of veteran statesmen counts for
little. Kenneth Waltz, whose book Theory of International Politics ranks him among the founding fathers of academic
international relations, admonishes us to remember that "observation and experience never lead directly to knowledge
of causes."[7] In a later section, Waltz criticizes those who believe in a "reality that is out there," and tells us that
"what we think of as reality is itself an elaborate conception constructed and reconstructed through the ages."[8]
Raw information, in Waltz's view, is meaningless until we develop a theory to explain it. When we look at the world,
we see an indescribably complex--and seemingly infinite--array of objects and events. According to Waltz and those
who subscribe to his philosophy, we need theory to simplify this situation by telling us which of these things are
relevant, and what they mean.[9] Therefore, when formal modelers set out to study politics and strategy, they develop
their theories first, and apply their concepts to the material world afterward. We have no problem in the abstract with
deductive reasoning of the sort that undergirds theories of international relations; however, we observe that inductive
reasoning has a place in the study of politics. The theories resulting from strictly deductive reasoning may not
correspond to our conventional understandings of reality, but to those who follow this school of thought, this is not
necessarily a cause for concern. Such theorists, after all, are trying to explain and predict political events, not to
reproduce them.
Anthony Downs, author of An Economic Theory of Democracy, urges us to judge models not by the realism of their
underlying assumptions, but by the accuracy of their predictions.[10] Indeed, a reliable system that allowed us to
forecast the future would seem valuable. One is entitled to ask, however, how scholars can take an abstract theory of
the sort described above and use it to make specific, quantitative predictions about events in the real world. Academics
engaged in designing predictive models come in many varieties, but all of them employ the same basic technique.
First, researchers develop their fundamental assumptions about human behavior, associations, and relationships. We
are asked never to judge these assumptions, but to hold our criticism for the model's results. Next they express their
theory in terms of a mathematical relationship among discrete concepts known as variables. Finally, quantitative
analysts "operationalize" those variables by equating them with factors that can be measured in numerical terms.
The operationalization of variables is problematic. For example, as one aspect of national power, quantitative analysts
who wished to predict the outcome of a war might decide to condense their beliefs about the fighting spirit of armies
into a single factor labeled "morale," and decide arbitrarily to measure the "morale" of an army in terms of the average
amount which it pays its soldiers. This is the manner in which the assumptions to which Downs refers are put to use.
Assumptions, however, may matter more than Downs and others care to admit. The fact that theorists believe they can
predict events within the artificial realm of their own models does not mean that they can make meaningful
observations about the world outside the models. If, for instance, the French general staff had used this method to
forecast the outcome of a German invasion in 1940, we can safely assume that the forecast would have reflected their
belief that a defensive strategy would always be stronger than the offensive.
According to the Phoenix Factor theory, which has achieved some prominence in accounts of quantitative research into
international relations,[11] warfare does not change the balance of power between warring nations, except perhaps in
the short term.[12] Victorious nations seldom seem to realize long-term gains in power, and defeated nations seldom
suffer long-term losses. A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, the political scientists who formulated this hypothesis,
claim to have supported these propositions through empirical research. In their study, they chose to operationalize the
concept of national power in terms of Gross National Product.[13] When Organski and Kugler examined economic
statistics for selected participants in World Wars I and II, they found that, just as they expected, both losers and
winners promptly returned to levels of GNP similar to what their model predicted they would have enjoyed if there

had been no war. Thus, they conclude: "We are tempted to suggest that the outcomes of war, insofar as international
power is concerned, make no difference."[14]
Upon examination, however, one finds that Organski and Kugler have defined the term "nation" in a peculiarly narrow
fashion. Their study recognizes no connections between nations and types of national governments. When these
researchers conducted their study in the 1970s, they were able to look at a data table and see, for instance, that the
larger of the two regions labeled "Germany" had an acceptably high level of GNP.[15] Therefore, their model led them
to conclude that the German nation suffered no long-term loss of power from its defeat in World War II.[16] Some
observers, however, may feel that it is inappropriate to dismiss the racial, ideological, legal, and territorial motivations
for the World Wars. But according to the conventions of academic theory, Organski and Kugler may make whatever
assumptions they wish, and therefore the Phoenix Factor study is, by its own standards, a success.
The assumptions in this model are not unusual. Like most scholars of the popular "neo-realist" school, Organski and
Kugler prefer to assume that nation-states are "unitary actors," operating independently from leaders, people, and
government institutions. When academics apply these assumptions rigidly, however, their models can provide absurd
outcomes. Those who observe the world unaided by the model have little difficulty understanding the difference
between winning and losing a world war. So, even if one accepts the dubious proposition that the real significance of
conflicts between nation-states can be measured in purely economic terms, those of us who use the word "nation" in a
more ordinary sense must observe that as a consequence of World War II, the GNP of the Third Reich is zero.
Decisions, Decisions
Many formal modelers make assumptions about human behavior that deserve special attention. Most current theories of
formal modeling rely on the idea that people behave as what economists call "rational actors." According to the
rational actor theory, people make all the decisions in their lives on the basis of self-interest; even those who appear to
be acting altruistically must always have selfish purposes in mind.[17] Those who give money to charitable causes, for
instance, may do so with the hope, if not the intent, of deducting the donation from their taxes. To a rational actor
theorist, even people who honestly believe that they act out of motivations other than greed in fact actually base their
lives on unconscious cost-benefit calculations. The rational actor theory was popularized by economists who used it to
explain the world of business and investment. Political scientists have expanded this principle into a general rule for
all human activity, to the point where many academics deny that differences in culture, governmental system, ideology,
religion, or individual character have any significant effect upon international relations. Therefore, many formal
modelers see no reason to study history, geography, or foreign languages. According to their theories, all people
behave predictably and in comparable ways.[18]
Others find these generalizations of human psychology disturbing. Chalmers Johnson, a noted American expert on the
subject of East Asia, finds an upsetting lack of cultural understanding in quantitative research. Johnson and E. B.
Keehn observe:
In a recent book published by Harvard University Press, the professor of Japanese politics at Yale and the
professor of Japanese law at Chicago intend to enlighten us about Japanese politics by applying what is
called "rational-choice theory" to Japan. The two authors, whose chief qualification for this task seems to
be that they were both raised as children in Japan, get off to a rocky start. In order to illustrate the
distinction between principals and agents in their theory--bosses and underlings in plain language--they
invoke the "rational choice" made by Chinese coolies pulling barges through the Yangtze River gorges.
They offer the explanation that, "Acting collectively as principles, the coolies hired supervisors with whips
to prevent each other from free riding." It evidently never crossed the minds of these savants of coolie
motivation that their conclusion is so preposterous that it could be established (if at all) only empirically-by some on-the-spot discovery of a hitherto unknown guild of Chinese masochists. The idea that the
coolies paid supervisors to whip them is not one that can be established deductively from theory. What is
needed is evidence. Did the coolies actually have a choice, or were they perhaps members of a prison
gang? Where and how did they hire their tormentors? Worthless research in academic political science is
not new, but in the face of stern competition this seems to establish a new low.[19]

The fact that rational actor theorists intentionally ignore realities such as the nature of coolie labor would seem to
discredit their ideas as a reliable means for examining international relations. The refusal of some theorists to
acknowledge the possibility that people might act on the basis of motivations such as duty, honor, or community spirit
flies in the face of history and, perhaps, personal experience. Those who have committed themselves to serve their
communities or to defend their country in war may be entitled to find this proposition offensive.
Furthermore, when the rational actor principle is used to develop theories of decisionmaking apart from economics, the
level of abstraction in formal theory climbs to new highs. The idea that one can use a concept such as the rational actor
to forecast outcomes of political events rests on four inherent beliefs:
It is possible to identify the key decisions that must be taken to shape a particular policy, and to isolate those
choices from the other decisions that surround them.
It is possible to identify and differentiate all the options available to decisionmakers.
It is possible to calculate the costs and benefits that each decisionmaker will experience from each option.
People in the real world, subconsciously if not consciously, will calculate their costs and benefits according to
the principles and methods employed by the modelers.
With these assumptions one can construct elaborate tables and decision trees to explain how a political decision will
unfold. These models, however, are almost certainly too stylized to survive contact with the actual environment of
international relations. In politics and war, seemingly minor decisions can have long-term consequences. The costs and
benefits of each "option" are changing and uncertain. A nation that fields a new class of weapon may be able to change
dramatically strategic cost-benefit analysis, while creating risks and vulnerabilities elsewhere in military or political
activities. And leaders who cannot change the actual costs and benefits of a given action may attempt to fool their
adversaries by adopting an unanticipated strategy.
Even if we presume that political scientists can factor into their models all of these sources of change, they will still
have failed to address the real issues of politics and war. The difficult part of strategic planning and military operations
is not deciding which option to choose, it is putting one's decision into effect. One cannot simply opt to carry out a
surprise attack; one must make sure that the enemy is surprised. Similar principles apply in the world of politics. This,
perhaps, is the meaning behind Clausewitz's remark that although everything in war is simple, the simplest things are
difficult.
Causality or Coincidence?
Not only are the assumptions of formal modeling questionable, but the premise of quantitative research--the idea that
statistical analysis can reveal previously unknown truths about politics--is doubtful as well. Statistical correlations
cannot explain the causes of political events. In order to understand the fallacy in the statistical approach, it is helpful
to consider its origins. Quantitative methods of analyzing human affairs have been flawed since their inception.
One of the first 20th-century books on the subject was Lewis Fry Richardson's Mathematical Psychology of War,
published in 1919.[20] Richardson's service in the Friends' Ambulance Unit in France during World War I had exposed
him firsthand to the horrors of war. This experience, coupled with his existing deep commitment to pacifism as a
Quaker, led him to abandon other academic endeavors in order to pursue what is now known as peace research. In
1960 Richardson published two books that remain influential among quantitative researchers, Arms and Insecurity and
Statistics of Deadly Quarrels.[21]
Richardson theorized that arms races cause wars. To confirm his hypothesis, he used the two World Wars as case
studies, comparing his theories to historical data until he found a set of statistics that supported his hypothesis.
According to Richardson, his method of analysis had created a breakthrough, and others have adopted his technique.
When academic political scientists test their models against historical examples, they adapt their statistical formulas to
explain as many examples of past war as possible. Political scientists who employ this method as a matter of course
are free to study any set of data that suits their theory, free to ignore any data that seem troublesome, and free to tinker
with their data to make the theory "predict" or "describe" the consequences of actions for which history has already
revealed the results.

Most reputable scholars, one presumes, resist the temptation to confirm their theories (and thus advance their careers)
through the selective use of statistics. Nevertheless, even the most forthright are on dubious ground when they claim
that their quantitative models have identified "causes" of political events. Statistical analysis allows us to measure
correlations or trends between events, but it does not tell us what these correlations or trends mean. The fact that two
things happen in sequence may mean that one caused the other, but it may also be true that some outside factor caused
either or both. Worse yet, the sequence may merely be a coincidence.
The following simplistic example illustrates the problem with correlations. Suppose a political scientist theorizes that
dairy production greatly affects the incidence of warfare. He expresses this idea as a mathematical equation and uses
statistical analysis to test his hypothesis. In 12 of 15 cases he studies, he finds that dairy production among the
combatants dropped by more than 10 percent in the month preceding the conflict. Does this discovery, referred to as
"variable correlation," imply that national security professionals need to keep an eye on dairy production? Probably
not. The fact that dairy production declined before a war does not mean that the drop in dairy production caused the
war. Such data, or "variables" if you prefer, must not merely have a "relationship" or "correlation" with the incidence
of war. For these mathematical models to be successful, data must be proven to be "causally related" to war.
In a more realistic scenario, suppose the same formal modeler assumes that increases in arms expenditures lead to a
higher incidence of warfare, expresses the idea as a mathematical equation, and uses statistical analysis to test his
hypothesis. In 14 of 17 cases of war analyzed, arms expenditures among the combatants increased by more than 12
percent in the month preceding the conflicts. Does this mean that arms races cause wars? Again, one has every reason
to be skeptical. Is it not equally plausible that the deterioration of political relations that leads to war also causes
national leaders to embark on arms races? What of the examples where war did not occur? The idea that a correlation
between two events proves that one has caused the other is a classic error in logic, which goes by the Latin phrase post
hoc ergo propter hoc (after this, therefore because of this). Contemporary statisticians caution that "correlation does
not equal causation," and devotees of academic political science are aware of the questions this principle raises about
their technique. In a book written to explain proper quantitative modeling technique, David Singer observes:
In the methodological literature, one increasingly encounters the concepts of internal and external validity
when examining a research design. Essentially, the validity issue can be translated into the question: to
what extent does the research design permit us to infer "causality" or some approximation thereof? To be
more precise, the issue is not one of the validity of the design (or of the experiment), but of the inferences
we seek to draw from the results of the investigation.[22]
In his treatment of "causality" Singer is forced to acknowledge that political events may occur as the result of two (or
many more) causal sequences. For example, wars may be caused by C, which was caused by B, which was caused by
A. Accepting this admission, we can never know if the model has captured the correct series of sequences or all the
contributing events within each intermediate condition, since we are not sure of the number of sequences involved in
the political event. Further, Singer acknowledges that a single variable may sometimes be the key to a political event,
but that other events appear to be caused by multiple variables. He is absolutely right. Modelers and statistical analysts
can never be sure that they are capturing the correct variables, much less that their method of operationalizing those
variables is reasonable or even relevant to the matter at hand. Singer, moreover, admits that some political events are
caused not merely by the sum of multiple variables, but by the interactions of those variables.
Singer's recommendation for the academic political science discipline is to lower the scientific standard of
demonstrating causality. He states that "in place of the notion of `causality,' my preference is for the related notion of
`explanation.'"[23] To an observer, however, these are differences without distinctions. It does not matter whether
political scientists use the word "explanation," "correlation," or "trend" as long as they continue to perform their
studies in the same way and expect others to accept their findings without challenge. However carefully they qualify
their language, quantitative political scientists imply that their work tells us something useful about cause-and-effect
relationships. Exercises in semantics do not sustain such claims.
The Quest for a Crystal Ball
It is useful to review the key claim of expected utility modelers: their methods allow them to forecast political events.

Anyone can appreciate the value of a crystal ball, so their claim should not be dismissed out of hand. When one
examines carefully the concept of prediction in political science, however, the claim leaves much to be desired.
Quantitative forecasts often appear successful because, after a certain point, the outcome of any given event does
indeed become predictable: "To hear the thunderclap is no indication of acute hearing."[24] Formal modelers, whose
training led them to think only in terms of existing models, completely failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Traditional analysts, on the other hand, were free from the beginning of the East-West confrontation to
speculate on the true nature of new international system in all its richness. George Kennan's analysis of the future of a
bipolar world, published in 1947, clearly foresaw the possibility that a state with the economic weakness, ideological
expectations, and overextended military commitments of the Soviet Union might collapse internally.[25] Furthermore,
Kennan did not merely predict how the Cold War would end, he proposed a philosophy of foreign policy designed to
ensure that it would end benignly. Kennan's insight came not from the use of a rigid methodology, but from the
wisdom gained through an understanding of history and a relatively bias-free appraisal of conditions in the postwar
Soviet Union.
In order to defend their relevance, most quantitative modelers refuse to admit that it is possible for us to take this kind
of active role in shaping history. This attitude is well demonstrated in a recent issue of Military Intelligence in which a
supporter of quantitative methods states that "respected historians" agree that "major historical events" would have
varied little with different actors.[26] Although it is difficult to respond to such vague claims by unspecified historians,
the first chapters of Liddell Hart's Defense of the West seem relevant here. Hart discusses the French collapse in 1940,
the German defeat after Stalingrad, and the success of the Normandy invasion, noting that in each case there was a
point when the leaders of the losing side could have turned defeat into victory simply by following a different strategy.
If Hart is correct, these leaders could have changed the outcome of World War II.
The article in Military Intelligence also asserts that "switching Generals Robert E. Lee and `Stonewall' Jackson with
Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman would not have caused a different end state for the Civil War."[27]
Perhaps. It might be more pertinent to ask what would have happened if fate had switched Jefferson Davis with
Abraham Lincoln. With such simplistic historical analyses, supporters of quantitative methodology inadvertently point
to the weaknesses of their predictive technique. Modern political science may affirm the fact that broad trends can lead
to "inevitable" results. But as theories of chaos and complex adaptive systems mature, their tendency is to challenge
linearity in all its manifestation in human affairs. Few concepts for explaining human behavior could be more rigidly
linear than quantitative analysis in its present form.
Academic Debates and Beyond
Formal modeling and quantitative research have found wide acceptance in American universities, but they have also
aroused powerful counter-arguments. Even political scientists who favor the use of abstract theory in the study of
politics have decried the Procrustean rigidity of statistical modelers. For those who still find quantitative methods
attractive, theorist Hedley Bull's 1969 criticism of the emerging method remains devastating:
I know of no model that has assisted our understanding of international relations that could not have been
expressed as an empirical generalization. This, however, is not the reason why we should abstain from
them. The freedom of the model-builder from the discipline of looking at the world is what makes him
dangerous; he slips easily into a dogmatism that empirical generalization does not allow, attributing to the
model a connection with reality it does not have. . . . He has provided an intellectual exercise and no
more.[28]
Writer and nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie noted that the spread of the quantitative mind-set has had a harmful effect
upon policy analysis. Brodie remarks that while intangible issues of morale, political ideology, and national will may
decide wars, the concepts do not fit into models. Therefore, those who find models appealing too often end up shunting
these factors aside. He wrote about his experience at RAND:
Within RAND itself there was a quiet but strongly-felt differential between those who knew how to handle
graphs and mathematical symbols . . . and those who merely knew how to probe political issues. Elegance
of method is indeed marvelously seductive, even when it is irrelevant or inappropriate to the major

problems.[29]
In response to such arguments, modelers and quantitative researchers have tried to brand their opponents as Luddites.
They would have us believe that those who object to their technique are merely trying to resist the inevitable
development of political studies into a true science. One author, for instance, labels critics of the formal quantitative
approach as that "large segment of the community" which "detests science, statistics, and theory."[30]
To the contrary, Leo Strauss summarizes the issue of quantitative research as follows:
Only a great fool would call the new political science diabolic: it has no attributes peculiar to fallen angels.
It is not even Machiavellian, for Machiavelli's teaching was graceful, subtle, and colorful. Nor is it
Neronian. Nevertheless one may say of it that it fiddles while Rome burns. It is excused by two facts: it
does not know that it fiddles, and it does not know that Rome burns.[31]
Opponents of the quantitative method value objective techniques as much as those supposedly "scientific" analysts who
practice statistical modeling. But academic theories should conform to the material world in a way that quantitative
models cannot. Strategists have to cope with the art of war as well as the science of war. The two are inseparable, and
the strategic leader who favors one over the other places his force and the nation it defends at great risk. Academia
offers a wealth of invaluable resources to military professionals, but among these resources are concepts and
conclusions that are worse than useless. Let the user beware.
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